Back in March, we pointed out some important similarities between the current financial environment and that of the 1970s.

Aside from gratuitous decades-old pop culture references, the main focus of the article was on real short-term interest rates, which we approximated by subtracting the year-over-year CPI inflation rate from the Fed funds rate. At the time, real rates by this measure had just turned negative, meaning that the Fed funds rate was actually lower than the rate of CPI inflation. We thought this an important development because the real Fed funds rate provides an indication of the tightness (or lack thereof) of monetary policy.

Checking back in on those real interest rates, we see that they have proceeded further into negative territory and now rest at -3.6%.

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The following is taken from a letter to investing clients written on the evening of Tuesday, July 8. 
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The Bear Market Continues

You may recall from our last investment update that we were unconvinced by the stock rally that was then taking place. This is what we said at the time:

By early March, the stock market (as measured by the S&P 500) had declined nearly 20% from its peak. Since then, however, it has made a big comeback and is now down less than 10%. Is the downturn over?

We are skeptical.

In early 2007 we wrote an article summarizing the risks in the U.S. stock market. The article cited a study by legendary value investor Jeremy Grantham in which it was shown that, on average, long term stock market returns have corresponded quite well with valuations at the time of investment.

Here we reproduce Grantham's study with updated data and a variation or two, followed by some thoughts about where we are now in the markets and what to do about it.

Remember last year when we made fun of the financial media for raving about the completely meaningless fact that the Dow had crossed a round number? The following image was captured from the CNN homepage on April 25, 2007:

Commodities have endured a steep selloff over the past couple of weeks, a fact that has prompted vast hordes of market analysts to proclaim, with absolute certainty, that the "commodities bubble" has burst.

We find the whole situation to be a bit ridiculous. After all, the large majority of these very same analysts were entirely unable to identify the hugest housing bubble in the recorded history of the world, and before that, most of them were unable to identify the hugest stock bubble in the recorded history of the world. As a matter of fact, many of them have spent the past several years warning about an imminent collapse in commodity prices (which didn't happen) at the very same time that they were denying the aforementioned hugest-ever real estate bubble and assuring everyone that home prices would keep rising (which also didn't happen).

Have they now suddenly started getting it right?

We've believed for quite some time that the current period bears much resemblance, economically speaking, to the 1970s. Consider the following trends, all of which took place in the 1970s and are doing so again today:

• The stock market remains range-bound over the long term as inflation eats away at real stock valuations.
• Real bond yields remain very low and sometimes go negative.
• Gold, commodities, and other inflation-hedge investments are in a multi-year bull market.
• The Federal Reserve is continually behind the curve on fighting inflation.
• On weekends I wear plaid Sansabelt slacks and a mint-green polyester jacket with lapels so enormous that I am occasionally borne aloft during strong winds.

We can add another similarity to the list: the term "stagflation" is now showing up all over the news again.

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This article is adapted from a letter to investing clients originally written on January 9, 2008.
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Going into 2007, we already knew that whenever the economy slows down, the government floods the system with money in an attempt to "reflate" asset prices and economic activity. This is accomplished via monetary policy, which when all is said and done effectively entails printing money, and fiscal policy, which effectively consists of the government spending money it doesn't have. We knew this would be the policy response because that's exactly what the powers that be did during the prior downturn, and because those actions were considered to have been a huge success in keeping the prior recession mild (despite all the imbalances that the reflation efforts eventually induced).

What we didn't know was just how panicky and violent the policy response would be at the very first sign of trouble.

Global stock markets sold off hard on Sunday night (the US markets were closed on Monday so they couldn't react), and then sold off even harder last night. This morning, the Federal Reserve announced a surprise intra-meeting rate cut of .75%, bringing the Fed funds rate down to 3.5%. (Of course, this is one of the most widely anticipated "surprises" we've ever witnessed, but never mind that.)

Beyond all the dramatic headlines, there are a few very instructive details about today's move.

We have some thoughts on what may take place in 2008, but first we want to review the major predictions and observations we made in 2007.

Looking back over the articles we wrote last year (of which there were embarrassingly few -- something we intend to change in 2008!), the major themes we discussed largely turned out to be correct.

Back in March, we wrote an article in which we outlined a possible financial market roadmap -- a sequence of events that we thought the markets were likely to follow. Here is the roadmap we spelled out at the time:

We at PCA have been bearish on San Diego housing for quite some time. One of our earliest concerns was that the rampant use of risky home loans, especially "teaser rate" loans that traded a low initial monthly payment for a potentially much higher payment down the road, would lead to extensive foreclosures if the borrowers' hoped-for home price appreciation didn't materialize. The inevitable fallout from all that reckless lending was one of the cornerstones of our long-held belief that San Diego would eventually experience a housing correction that surpassed the region's early-1990s real estate downturn in severity.

When we expressed these concerns, we were almost universally informed in no uncertain terms that foreclosures could never get as bad as they did in the 1990s unless San Diego experienced widespread unemployment.

Now that illusion has been shattered.

With much fanfare, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average crossed the 13,000 mark on April 25. On the day in question, of all the news in the world, CNN.com chose to display this as their big story:

An important aspect of our investing approach involves identifying big-picture trends to help us understand what's been happening in the financial markets and what's likely to take place in the future. To that end, we've outlined what we believe to be a possible "roadmap" to chart out where the financial markets have been and where they are headed in the months and years ahead.

By 2001, San Diego had enjoyed a nice housing boom. Since bottoming out in 1996 after a nasty housing downturn, the price of the typical single family home had risen by 74 percent. As of 2001, adjusted for inflation, San Diego homes were more expensive than they'd ever been (at least since the 1970s, which is as far back as the available data goes).

At this point, one might have expected home price growth to slow down or even flatten out. But the show was only getting started. The typical home, already somewhat richly valued, would go on to nearly double in price in just a few years.

It is often noted that in the long-run, stocks are the best asset to own. It has also been noted that “in the long-run we are all dead.” So the question becomes how long an investor must wait for that attractive long-term performance to be realized. If one is not careful, it could be a long time.

Our investment objective is simple. We strive to outperform the market indices over longer time periods, after all fees, while taking less risk. While it’s easy to spot bubbles or buying opportunities in retrospect, there is no such clarity “in the moment” and we are forced to make prospective decisions about where to be invested. Without the benefit of hindsight, market risks are of paramount concern to us.

Holders of cash and its equivalents (CDs, T-bills, and the like) may not earn much in the way of interest, but they are at least certain to get all of their principal back. For this reason, many people assume that holding all cash is the safest and most conservative possible investment stance.

But there is a hidden threat to cash holders: while they are assured of getting all their money back, the money they get may be worth less than it was when they first deposited it. This is what's known as "purchasing power risk."

We believe purchasing power risk to be a serious issue for today's cautious investors.